One of the most mysterious phenomena in science is the nature of conscious experience. Due to its subjective nature, a reductionist approach is having a hard time in addressing some fundamental questions about consciousness. These questions are squarely and quantitatively tackled by a recently developed theoretical framework, called integrated information theory (IIT) of consciousness. In particular, IIT proposes that a maximally irreducible conceptual structure (MICS) is identical to conscious experience. However, there has been no principled way to assess the claimed identity. Here, we propose to apply a mathematical formalism, category theory, to assess the proposed identity and suggest that it is important to consider if there exists a proper translation between the domain of conscious experience and that of the MICS. If such translation exists, we postulate that questions in one domain can be answered in the other domain; very difficult questions in the domain of consciousness can be resolved in the domain of mathematics. We claim that it is possible to empirically test if such a functor exists, by using a combination of neuroscientific and computational approaches. Our general, principled and empirical framework allows us to assess the relationship between the domain of consciousness and the domain of mathematical structures, including those suggested by IIT.
Introduction
The material basis of subjective conscious phenomena remains one of the most difficult scientific questions (Chalmers, 1996) . While it is impossible to doubt if the reader is consciously awake (as opposed to unconscious as in deep dreamless sleep) and visually conscious of this text at this moment (as opposed to blind and seeing nothing), it appears very difficult to be completely certain about conscious states of other persons, seems more difficult to infer consciousness in babies or animals, and looks even impossible to tell if artificial machines can ever achieve human-like consciousness.
Over the last 25 years, concerted neuroscientific approaches have established that consciousness arises from the interactions among some neurons in the thalamo-cortical systems (Boly et al., 2013; Dehaene and Changeux, 2011; Koch, 2004) . Now the field has matured enough to result in a specific theory, called integrated information theory (IIT) of consciousness (Oizumi et al., 2014; Tononi, 2004 Tononi, , 2008 Tononi, , 2012 Tononi, , 2015 . IIT has strong explanatory power in many observed neuroscientific enigmatic facts about consciousness and proposes a precise mathematical formalism that should be identical to consciousness.
However, it has been unclear whether there exists any principled and empirical ways to assess the proposed identity. And, it seems unclear what it means for some mathematical formalism and consciousness to be identical.
To address these issues, here, we propose that a fundamental mathematical formalism, called category theory can be a very powerful tool. In category theory, a category is defined as a collection of objects and arrows. 4 In its standard usage, a category refers 4 Mathematically speaking, a category C consists of (1) a collection of objects, such as X and (2) a collection of arrows, which define relationship between any pair of objects, such as X and Y, such that (3) for every object X there is a selfreferential arrow 1x: X→X, (A) Three objects in geometry and those in algebra can be mapped between them by preserving their structural relationships. This mapping is called a functor in category theory. (B) In category theory, quality of similarity can be precisely defined with graded levels. Existence of a functor is relatively weak, requiring relatively loose conditions. Yet, existence of a functor is already quite powerful to the extent that it can guarantee the translation of proof of the Brower's theorem between geometry and algebra. We conjecture that the domain of mathematical structures and the domain of consciousness or qualia can be shown to be similar up to "categorically equivalent".
to a class of things that share certain properties, as in categories of objects, humans and animals. The standard definition of category is consistent with, but less fundamental and abstract than, the definition of category in category theory.
This formalization of categories allows us to compare and relate two seemingly complete separate domains of knowledge, such as mathematical concepts and conscious experience. In the following, we first introduce category theory and then briefly review the two to-be linked worlds of consciousness and mathematical structures according to IIT. Next we outline what strategies need to be taken for this research program. Finally, we offer the future prospects, promising the dissolution of Hard problem.
Category theory
Category theory was introduced in 1945 by mathematicians Eilenberg and Mac Lane (Awodey, 2010; Mac Lane, 1998) . Category theory is now considered as the foundation of mathematics, a position previously held by set theory. In category theory, everything is considered as either an object or an arrow that connects objects. Objects and arrows can include almost any concept. In Fig. 1A , we consider three objects in geometry (a disk, a ring and a double-ring) and three objects in algebra (a set that is composed of only zero {0}, a set of integer {Z}, and a set of 2 integers {Z 2 }). Interestingly, when we relate these objects in each domain 5 of mathematics, their relationships can be proven to be mathematically analogous. More precisely, category theory says that there exists a functor between them. A functor is a structure-preserving map between categories. 6 We focus on two important properties of category theory. First, category theory provides a mathematical framework for translating a relationship in one domain to a distinct and separate domain by composable, that is, gf: X→Z, (5) a self-referential arrow is both a left and right unit for composition, that is, if f: X→Y, then f1x = f = 1yf, and (6) composition is associative, that is, (hg)f = h(gf).
5 Throughout this paper, we use "domain" to mean a slightly different concept in "domain" in mathematics. Our usage is more colloquial, referring to a set of highly related objects, concepts and phenomena. 6 Mathematically speaking, it means that (1) any object m in M has a mapped object q in Q, that is, F(m) = q, (2) any arrow f in M has a mapped arrow g in Q, that is, F(f) = g, (3) F preserves identities, that is, for any object X in C, F(1x)=1 (F(X)) and (4) F preserves composition, that is, for any pair of arrows f: X→Y and g: Y→X in C,
use of a structure-preserving map, or a functor. Second, category theory brings a precise mathematical formalism to assess whether or not two separate domains of knowledge are similar and in what qualitative way they are similar.
As to the first point, we briefly describe a powerful example of a mathematical proof. In geometry, there is a fundamental theorem due to Brouwer (Fulton, 1995) . This theorem, known as Brouwer's fixed-point theorem, is notoriously difficult to prove within the domain of geometry. Briefly, this theorem states that any continuous function that maps any point on a disk to another point on the same disk leaves at least a single point that does not change its position. For example, any rotation about the center of a disk would leave the position of the center of the rotation unchanged. While difficult to prove within the domain of geometry, by translating geometric objects over to the algebraic domain, it can be seen that the proof of this theory amounts to a proof that there is no isomorphic mapping from {0} into a set of integers, which is rather easy to prove. Today, many mathematicians go from one domain to another in order to prove theorems. In fact, a similar method has been used to prove Fermat's last theorem. Outside of the field of mathematics, category theory has bridged across different disciplines. Recent work, for example, have shown the analogy in the precise sense among quantum mechanics, topology, logic and computation (Baez and Stay, 2009) , which can be used as a basis to translate the proofs in one domain to the others. Application of category theory into neuroscience and cognitive science has recently emerged (Ehresmann and Gomez-Ramirez, 2015; Phillips and Wilson, 2010) .
As to the second point, category theory offers extremely useful tools to characterize similarity between the different domains. In category theory, the nature of similarity is precisely defined as different degrees of the structure-preservation through mathematical terms; requiring more and more conditions amounts to strong similarity. In this framework, the qualitative strength of similarity degrades from "identical", "categorically isomorphic", "categorically equivalent", "existence of adjunction" to "existence of functor". With these graded scales of similarity, we can precisely understand in what sense IIT's proposed mathematical structures and conscious experience are similar. Though it is weakest among the above list, "existence of functor" is sufficient to prove Brouwer's theorem mentioned above. We believe that finding a functor between IIT's mathematical structure and consciousness might be also sufficient to bring about many theoretical and empirical results, without requiring "identity" as claimed by the original theory. Before the invention of category theory, there was no systematic framework to characterize this kind of qualitatively graded levels of similarity (Mac Lane, 1998) . From a category-theoretic point of view, strength of similarity, analogy, metaphor, and relationship that are used in many different scientific disciplines can be qualitatively characterized in a very precise manner. It might sound totally counter to some readers to see a claim such as a very "precise" and "qualitative" characterization, but this is indeed the core and general feature of category theory.
It is these two properties of category theory that are likely to be useful in considering the so-called "mind-body" problem which regards the nature of mapping between consciousness and brain. Decades of neuroscientific research have culminated to a suggestion that it is not the brain per se, but rather some type of mathematical structure that maps to the domain of consciousness (Oizumi et al., 2014; Tononi, 2004 ). While we focus on a particular mathematical structure, called a maximally irreducible conceptual structure (MICS) in the integrated information theory (IIT), our argument generalizes to any mathematical structures that can be derived from the brain.
In the next section, we explain what we mean by consciousness and mathematical structure, which are to be linked by a functor.
Qualia and mathematical structure as the two domains to be linked by category theory

Consciousness and qualia
In neuroscience, consciousness usually refers to either level or contents of consciousness (Boly et al., 2013) . Level ranges from very high in the aroused awake state to low as in coma, vegetative states, deep dreamless sleep, and deep general anesthesia. At a given level of consciousness, every experiential moment contains various contents of consciousness. Contents of consciousness are synonymous with the other concepts such as qualia (its singular is a quale) (Balduzzi and Tononi, 2009; Kanai and Tsuchiya, 2012) or phenomenal consciousness (Block, 2005) . A sense of self or selfawareness is considered as one type of contents of consciousness. To avoid the ambiguity, we use the term qualia from now on. Qualia can mean different concepts depending on whether they are used in the broad-or narrow-sense. A quale in the broad sense refers to a single moment of whole experience, composed of various contents, from various sensory modalities. A quale in the narrow sense refers to a specific aspect of one moment of experience. Two different qualia in the broad sense induced by two situations, such as seeing a red circle on the left or on the right, can be considered as inducing the same quale in the narrow sense, such as seeing a particular red circle regardless of its spatial locations (Kanai and Tsuchiya, 2012).
A maximally irreducible conceptual structure (MICS) in integrated information theory (IIT)
Integrated information theory (IIT) of consciousness is a recently developed theoretical framework (Oizumi et al., 2014; Tononi, 2004) . IIT provides a mathematical formalism, called a maximally irreducible conceptual structure (MICS) (Oizumi et al., 2014) , which is claimed to be "identical" to experience or qualia in the broad sense. According to IIT, a system generates consciousness as long as it generates non-zero integrated information. The MICS is the mathematical formalism that fully describes how the components of the system causally and irreducibly contribute to the whole system. The exact way to compute the MICS is not central to our argument here, but the interested reader can refer to (Oizumi et al., 2014) . Here, we briefly explain the essence of the IIT and the MICS, which are relevant to our discussion on how to assess the claimed identity with category theory.
IIT starts from identifying five essential properties of consciousness as follows (Tononi, 2015) . (1) Intrinsic existence: we experience consciousness only from our own intrinsic perspective, and our own consciousness exists independent of external observers. (2) Composition: consciousness is structured; a moment of experience, or a quale in the broad-sense, is always composed of various aspects of experience, or qualia in the narrow-sense. (3) Information: one moment of consciousness is highly informative because it excludes all other possible experiences that one can have at that moment. In other words, any single experience greatly reduces uncertainty about its own state. (4) Integration: consciousness is always integrated and experienced as a united whole. We cannot experience two independent consciousnesses at the same time. When a brain is split into two, consciousness also splits into two (Gazzaniga, 2005) . (5) Exclusion: consciousness is composed of a particular set of qualia in the narrow sense and it flows at a particular spatial and temporal scale. We cannot experience with more contents than we normally have, such as qualia in the broadsense that includes ultrasound, or less contents, such as qualia in the broad-sense that lacks color. We cannot also experience slower or faster flow of the time than we have. All possible experiences other than what we have are excluded.
From these five phenomenological axioms, IIT proposes five corresponding postulates, which can possibly support the identified phenomenological properties. To explain how the postulates lead to the MICS, consider Fig. 2 . Fig. 2A depicts all four possible states (1-4) of a system of two units, where each unit can be either "on" or "off". If each unit copies the state of the other with a time delay ( ), knowing the present state of the system completely determines its past state; if the present state is "off-on" (Fig. 2B, right) , the past state (Fig. 2B, left) has to be "on-off", removing uncertainty about the past. If the present state is unknown, uncertainty of the past state is maximal; the four states of this system (i.e., on-on, offoff, on-off, or off-on) are equally likely. By quantifying uncertainty using a concept of entropy, H = log 2 (the number of possible states), we can define the reduction of uncertainty with mutual information as I = H − H*, where I is the mutual information, H* represents conditional entropy, or how much uncertainty about the past remains given the present state. This formulation of mutual information is intrinsic because it concerns only the system's own state and does not relate to anything outside (extrinsic to) the system. Integrated information (˚) is the difference between the information derived from the whole system (I) compared with the sum of the information arising from its parts (I*): ˚ = I − I*. In the above example, if the system is partitioned into two parts (Fig. 2C ), each part cannot specify its past state even if its present state is known, thus I* = 0, and ˚ = 2. Thus, ˚ quantifies how much information is lost if the whole system is cut into its constituent parts. Importantly, ˚ can be exhaustively computed for any subsets in the system. For a system of three units, A, B, and C (Fig. 2D) , ˚ is defined within any combination of mechanisms (called sub-mechanisms), including A, B, C, AB, AC, BC as well as ABC. Now consider a system composed of logic gate A (OR), B (AND), and C (XOR) in a state, where A is on and B and C are off, (Fig. 2E , a figure panel taken from Figure 15 in Oizumi et al., 2014) . With a procedure in Oizumi et al. (2014) that is substantially more sophisticated than the one we sketched above, we can examine how each sub-mechanisms uniquely specifies and constrains possible states of the system in the past and the future. A subset of submechanisms that irreducibly specify the system's past and future are called concepts in IIT (Oizumi et al., 2014) . In Fig. 2E , a concept is depicted as a star in the 8-dimensional space (projected into 3 dimensions); the 8 dimensions correspond to 8 states of the system (000, 001, 110, etc.), separately for the past and the future. In this case, AC does not generate any concept because it does not integrate any information (i.e., ˚A C = 0) for the future state of any of the 7 possible sub-mechanisms (A, B, C, AB, BC, AC, and ABC), above and beyond A and C separately. 7 Thus, a maximally irreducible conceptual structure (MICS) for this system in this state is a constellation of 6 concepts in the 16-dimensional space (Fig. 2E) .
Importantly, IIT claims that a quale in the broad-sense is identical to a MICS, generated by a particular subset of the neural system, for example, a thalamo-cortical system excluding cerebellum. In other words, IIT proposes a mapping between a certain mathematical structure, which is derived from connectivity and a state of a certain subset of the neurons in the brain, and the particular quale that a subject of the brain is experiencing. 7 In IIT 3.0 (Oizumi et al., 2014) , the integrated information of a given submechanism is the minimum between the integrated information for the past and the future. In the exemplar case, it is important to realize that the current state of C = 0 completely determines the future state of B(AND) = 0. Thus, even when A and C are jointly considered, there is no new information about the future states of any possible sub-mechanisms, above and beyond what A and C are independently considered. Therefore, ˚A C = 0 in the future. Accordingly, there is no star both in the past and the future for AC in Fig. 2e . If the present state (at time t) of the system X(t) is "on-off", it completely specifies its past state at t − as "off-on", removing all uncertainty (H* = log2(1) = 0). The reduction of uncertainty can be quantified as mutual information: I = H − H* = 2. (c) If each unit is considered separately, each part cannot specify its past state (I* = 0). How much information is lost when the whole system (I) is cut into its constituent parts (I*) is integrated information: ˚ = I − I* = 2. (d) All possible subsets of a system (here, composed of unit A, B, and C), determines composition of all the interactions in the system. (e) For system ABC (inset), a maximally irreducible conceptual structure (MICS) can be derived as in the right side of the panel, according to IIT (Oizumi et al., 2014) . Each star is a concept, which is irreducible to its constituent parts.
It is important to note that this paper is neutral with respect to the particular approach taken by IIT (e.g., from phenomenological axioms to postulates, actual steps to compute a MICS) although we do believe that IIT is the most promising approaches at the moment. Our arguments here are general enough to hold to any kind of proposed mapping between the domain of qualia and the domain of mathematical structures, such as the MICS, derived from the connectivity and activity states of the brain, which has been proposed so far or which can be proposed sometime in the future.
To make the theory testable, with some assumptions and approximation, it is now possible to compute an approximated version of the MICS from empirical neuronal recordings, such as electrocorticogram (ECoG) directly recorded from the surface of the brain of awake human epilepsy patients (Haun et al., 2014; Oizumi et al., 2016) .
Three steps that are required for the category theory approach to consciousness
Our conjecture about qualia, the MICS and their relationship is that (1) the domain of the MICS is a category, (2) the domain of qualia is a category, and (3) there exists a functor which relates the two domains. Next, we consider if these conjectures would be valid or not.
Can the domain of the MICS be considered as a category?
Given that any mathematical concept can be interpreted in the framework of category theory, we see no problem in interpreting the MICS or an approximated MICS as a category.
The MICS in IIT is a complex web of interactions between submechanisms in a system and the whole system (Fig. 2E) . This structure essentially captures all possible causal interactions in the system, starting from those between two elements, through among more than three elements, to among populations of elements. 8 Such a hierarchy of causal interactions is the one that is reflected in the MICS or its approximation.
In this domain, it is also possible to define similarity using various types of metrics. The metrics would include quantitative distance metrics, such as Euclidean distance, Kullback-Leibler divergence, and Earth Mover's Distance, or more topological and qualitative metrics, such as inclusion and overlap. Various qualitatively different concepts of similarity in category theory (Fig. 1B) can be also used to characterize the similarity of mappings within the domain of the MICS.
Can the domain of qualia be considered as a category?
The question of whether or not the domain of qualia in the narrow-and/or broad-sense can be considered as a category turns out not straightforward to answer. While we believe there are no fundamental problems in regarding the domain of qualia in the narrow and/or broad sense as a category, we need more research to address this question.
In the narrow sense, a quale refers to a particular content of consciousness, which can be compared or characterized as a particular aspect of one moment of experience or a quale in the broad sense (Balduzzi and Tononi, 2009; Kanai and Tsuchiya, 2012) . Can category theory consider any qualia we experience as objects or arrows? Some qualia in the narrow sense are straightforward to consider as objects: a quale for a particular object or its particular aspect, such as color. There are, however, some aspects of experience that are apparently difficult to consider as objects. For example, we can experience a distance between the two cups, which is a relationship between the objects but itself has no physical object form. Such abstract conscious perception can be naturally regarded as a relationship between objects: an arrow. Further, there are some types of qualia that seem to emerge out of many parts, such as a face. A whole face is perceived as something more than a collection of its constituent parts; there is something special about a whole face. Psychological and neuroscientific studies of faces point to configural processing, that is, a web of spatial relationship among the constituent parts of a face is critical in perception of a whole face (Maurer et al., 2002) . In category theory, a complicated object, like a quale for a face, can be considered as an object that contains many arrows. Considered this way, any quale in the narrow sense can be considered as either an object, an arrow, or an object or arrow that contains any combinations of them.
In the broad sense, a quale refers to a moment of experience, including all the sensory modalities and all the experiential aspects. It is rather straightforward to consider any moment of experience as a web of objects and arrows that are consciously experienced.
These ideas in category theory are consistent with the analyses of one's own experience, called phenomenology, founded by Edmund Husserl. In particular, phenomenology considers objects as correlates of structural movements of phenomena (so called "constitutions") (Husserl, 1999) . 9 Such movements can be regarded as arrows. We anticipate that the more refined analysis incorporating phenomenological methods will be able to characterize the domain of qualia as a category.
Is there a functor between the two domains?
If we are convinced that (1) the MICS and (2) qualia are both categories, then the remaining job is to mathematically prove if there exists a functor between the two categories. A functor is a mapping between two categories. Importantly, a functor has to preserve structural relationships or arrows among objects in each category. Let us consider a functor F: M→Q (or Q→M) between two domains MICS (M) and qualia (Q). Here, we can consider arrows that signify similar. Any mapping F that preserves similarity relations denoted by arrows among the objects will qualify as a functor. As noted above, category theory is extremely flexible, thus, definitions of objects and arrows, as well as a functor can be flexibly defined to serve for a particular purpose. Here, we just provided one exemplar set of categories and a functor between them. Examination of possible categories and functors can be a fruitful research project.
Distinct two domains, such as those of qualia and the MICS, are unlikely to be "identical" according to the definition of "identical" in category theory. In category theory, "identical" is an extremely strong concept, requiring the two categories to be "exactly the same" in almost all aspects that can be examined. "Categorically isomorphic" is also very strong. More natural conjecture is that the two domains can be related up to "categorically equivalent" or "existence of adjunction". "Existence of a functor" is a much weaker level of "similarity", yet it is already quite powerful as mentioned in the first section. 10 We believe that there will be massive progress in understanding the relationship between qualia and the MICS, if we can find a functor between the two domains.
In the domains of both qualia and the MICS, it is easy to consider several elementary relationships or bidirectional arrows, such as different or similar. Any two visual experiences, for example, have a kind of obvious mutual similarity, in that they are both visual while they are obviously different from any auditory experiences. Likewise, any aspect of experience or a whole experience is either similar to or different from other experiences. These bidirectional arrows, indicating similarities or differences, can characterize any relationships between two arrows in the qualia domain. We expect the same can be said about any two arrows within the MICS domain. The question is, then, if there is a functor that preserves all these relationships between the two domains.
Empirical research programs for finding a functor between the categories of qualia and the MICS
Is there any empirical way to find a functor? We believe that a combination of the approximation of the MICS and the neuroscientific approach of consciousness, called the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC), can in principle test whether or not a proposed mapping between the qualia and the approximated version of the MICS can be considered as a functor. 11
Same stimuli, different qualia
One of the most powerful approaches in the NCC is to utilize visual illusions that generate distinct neural states and distinct conscious experiences, despite an identical physical input. Some of the most popular techniques include binocular rivalry (Blake and Logothetis, 2002) and backward masking (Breitmeyer and Ogmen, 2007) . In this approach, first we need to construct an approximated MICS based on neuronal recordings, which can be consisted of activity of many single units or many local field potentials, representing a population of neurons. There already exists approximated versions of integrated information (Oizumi et al., 2016) that can be applied to electrocorticogram (ECoG) recordings (Haun et al., 2014) . For example, in the "MICS" column of Fig. 3 , we show two hypothetical approximated MICS based on a set of 4 channels of ECoG recordings (channel A, B, C and D: indicated as 4 red points in the "brain" column of Fig. 3 ). 12 Next, we quantify and test if the different qualia, such as seeing a red dot or not (Fig. 3 left) , maps onto two different MICS. 13 If the two MICS turn out to be identical, reflecting the identical physical stimulus input, we can conclude that qualia and the MICS are not related by a functor from the MICS to qualia, because it did not preserve categorical structure: essentially the same MICS are corresponding to essentially different qualia. approximated versions may be meaningfully compared above the level of existence of a functor in a useful way.
11 Finding a functor between the MICS and its approximation is a separate mathematical project, but it is likely to be easier one to solve. 12 For each of all 6 pairs (e.g., AB, BC) we obtain the approximated integrated information (see Fig. 2A -C, Oizumi et al., 2016) . The magnitude of the integrated information for each pair is represented as the y coordinate of each red dot (Fig. 3 "MICS"). For each pair (e.g., AB), we can add another channel to form two trios of channels (e.g., ABC and ABD), which are represented as two dark blue dots and connected from the red dot. Finally, we have a quartet of channels ABCD, whose integrated information value is indicated by the y coordinate of the pale blue dot. The x position of the each dot is the same between the two MICS, but assigned arbitrary for visualization purpose. Importantly, for each different visual stimulus, we can obtain neural responses from a set of electrodes, from which we can construct the approximated MICS empirically. For the detailed procedure, see Haun et al. (2014) . 13 For refined analyses, it would help to have visibility ratings in each trial to characterize the phenomenology in more details (Ramsøy and Overgaard, 2004) . Fig. 3 . NCC experiments, combined with the approximation of the MICS, can assess if qualia and the MICS are related by a functor. When a powerful illusion such as general flash suppression (Wilke et al., 2003) is presented to subjects, they may or may not see the red dot on a trial-by-trial basis. An approximated version of the MICS can be constructed based on activity of a population of neurons, whose activity is strongly correlated with contents of consciousness. With the approximated MICS, we can now test if a proposed mapping qualifies as a functor. If it is a functor, it has to preserve all structural relationships in each domain. In other words, a functor would relate two very similar MICS with two very similar qualia as well as two different MICS with two different qualia.
Different stimuli, same qualia
Similarly, we can also adopt using noise techniques or more elaborate "perceptual metamer" techniques (Freeman and Simoncelli, 2011) . Here, we present two physically different images to subjects. However, resulting qualia are the same. In this case, the MICS should be the same regardless of the difference in physical stimuli. If so, we can conclude that the MICS and qualia are not related by a functor from Qualia to the MICS, because it did not preserve categorical structure: the same qualia are corresponding to essentially different MICS.
Qualia and the MICS in rewired animals?
We can also consider changing the brain's connections to see if qualia and the MICS change in parallel. One powerful test can be rewiring experiments in ferrets as performed by Muriganka Sur and colleagues (von Melchner et al., 2000; Sharma et al., 2000) . In this research, they manipulated the anatomical connections of the ferrets' visual and auditory system, such that visual input from the eyes reached to the auditory cortex. Importantly, they made this manipulation throughout the development in only one side of the brain. In the other intact side of the brain, these ferrets received visual information at the visual cortex and auditory information at the auditory cortex. After development and successful training of discrimination between visual and auditory modalities using the intact side of their brain (i.e. teaching the ferrets to behaviorally distinguish between seeing and hearing), the ferrets were confronted with visual information that reached only the rewired auditory cortex. Even though the visual information was processed in the rewired auditory cortex, the ferrets responded that they saw (von Melchner et al., 2000) . This suggests that qualia generated in the intact visual cortex were likely to be similar to qualia generated in the rewired auditory cortex, and in turn that these qualia were quite different from qualia generated in the intact auditory cortex. Though we cannot directly ask qualia the ferrets had, this interpretation is reasonable based on similar situations arising in human subjects who were trained with sensory substitution devices (Bach-y-Rita, 2004; Bach-y-Rita et al., 1969) . Given that local neural connectivity in the rewired auditory cortex became much similar to the visual cortex (Sharma et al., 2000) , it is likely that the MICS generated from rewired auditory cortex became more similar to the MICS generated from the intact visual cortex than the MICS generated from the intact auditory cortex.
In these exercises, it will be possible to refine computational methodology to approximate the MICS, the brain regions to record neural activity, what types of stimuli and paradigms to use, and so on. This approach is consistent with the ongoing research projects that try to identify the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC), and it extends its potential toward identifying the domain of the mathematical structures that have equivalent structures as the domain of qualia.
What are the consequences of finding a functor between qualia and the MICS?
What can we learn if we can find a functor between qualia and the MICS? As we showed an example in Introduction, one of the most powerful applications of category theory is to provide a definitive answer to a question that cannot be easily addressed in one domain by translating the question by a functor to the other domain, where the translated question can be much easier to address.
We proposed the three steps to apply the category theory approach in consciousness studies. First, we need to characterize our own phenomenological experience with detailed and structured descriptions to the extent to accept the domain of qualia as a category. Second, we need to develop and refine ways to construct mathematical structures, such as the MICS from IIT, that are strongly constrained by the known neuronal facts about consciousness. The approximated versions of the MICS are most promising in this regard. Third, we should test if there exists a functor that preserves the structures of both qualia and the MICS. Once this is achieved, we can analyze the mathematical structures of a system, whose qualia are unknown (e.g., babies, bats, insects, plants or artificial systems), and translate it into the qualia domain. This is the procedure that we propose to solve extremely difficult questions in the qualia domain.
These questions are actually expected to be answerable if IIT can be validated (Tononi and Koch, 2015) . Employing concepts of category theory, this paper aimed to contribute to provide a principled and mathematically rigorous way to assess the similarity of the two categories (Mac Lane, 1998) , that is, the domain of our conscious experience and the domain of any proposed mathematical structures, including the MICS in IIT. Although we focused on the MICS in IIT in this article, our argument is highly general and do not need to be restricted to the MICS in IIT. Further, our framework also allows us to assess and quantify the quality of analogy between qualia and any approximated version of the MICS, facilitating empirical research projects along this line.
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